Why Trump is hitting 60 economies with fresh forced labor tariffs

The Trump administration is preparing fresh forced labor tariffs on 60 of America’s biggest trading partners, widening its trade fight from China to allies including the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

The move follows a formal US Trade Representative finding that those economies have failed, in different ways, to stop goods made with forced labor from entering trade channels.

The proposed duties would cover nearly all US imports, making this both a human-rights measure and a high-stakes attempt to rebuild Washington’s tariff machine.

Why the new tariffs matter

USTR said on June 2 that the acts, policies and practices of all 60 economies are “actionable” under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

In plain English, Washington says its biggest trading partners are not doing enough to block forced labor goods, and that this failure hurts US commerce.

The finding is unusually broad as USTR says the economies covered more than 99% of US imports in 2024, so this is not a narrow action aimed at a few risky sectors.

It is a near-global trade measure that reaches major allies, manufacturing hubs and emerging markets.

The tariff structure has two levels. Economies with a forced labor import ban, a partial regime, or a commitment through an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade would face an additional 10% duty.

Others would face 12.5% as USTR has proposed exceptions and a textile mechanism for some apparel and textile imports.

The real deadline driving this

The forced labor case also has a clock behind it as the Trump administration’s current 10% blanket import surcharge under Section 122 expires on July 24 unless Congress extends it.

That matters because the Supreme Court ruled in February that IEEPA, the emergency-powers law previously used for broad tariffs, does not authorise the president to impose duties.

That leaves the White House looking for a sturdier route. Section 301 is slower because it requires investigations, comments, hearings and a legal record.

But once that record exists, it gives USTR a more durable way to impose tariffs country by country.

That is why analysts see the case as doing two jobs. It advances a human-rights argument that is hard for partners to reject outright. It also helps replace the tariff authority that is running out.

The Atlantic Council’s tariff tracker has described the wider shift into Sections 301 and 232 as an effort to maintain “virtually unchanged tariff revenue” in 2026.

Deborah Elms of the Hinrich Foundation earlier warned that the timetable looked “unrealistically short” for an investigation covering 60 economies.

That concern matters more because the public process is being squeezed into the weeks before the July deadline.